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Developing a strategic direction for
airports to enable the provision of services to both network and low-fare carriers

M.R.
Pitt,  A.W.
Brown. Facilities. Bradford:
Jan/Feb
2001.Vol.19, Iss. 1/2;  pg. 52

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Subjects:

Classification Codes

5100 Facilities
management,  5320 Quality control,  2310 Planning,  8350 Transportation & travel
industry,  9175 Western Europe

Locations:

Dublin Ireland

Author(s):

M.R.
Pitt ,  A.W.
Brown

Document types:

Feature

Publication title:

Facilities. Bradford: Jan/Feb
2001. Vol. 19, Iss. 1/2;  pg. 52

Source type:

Periodical

ISSN/ISBN:

02632772

ProQuest document ID:

119045874

Text Word Count

4673

Document URL:

http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=119045874&sid=11&Fmt=3&clientId=29909&RQT=309&VName=PQD

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Abstract (Document
Summary)

As airports strive to attract new carriers, a new strategic direction is necessary
to address the differing needs of the 2 main types of airline -- network
carriers and low-cost airlines.
This paper examines the strategic response of Dublin airport to the
presence of the 2 types of carriers
requiring different services, and the difficulties faced by airport
managers in the provision of the differing levels of service required by
different customers. It sets up the strategic differences and suggests the
resultant implications for facilities requirements. It is shown that, in
most cases, the provision of differing levels of side-by-side service to
airlines is not possible with the existing strategic direction and that
new directions are needed to facilitate the long-term expansion of air
transport.

Full Text (4673
words)

Copyright MCB UP Limited (MCB) Jan/Feb 2001

M.R. Pitt: M.R. Pitt is a Lecturer at Heriot-Watt University,
Edinburgh, UK.

A.W. Brown: A.W. Brown is a Lecturer at Heriot-Watt University,
Edinburgh, UK.

Introduction

The rise of the low-fare carrier

The low-cost air carriers are competing against rail operators on the
grounds of price, but additionally, and perhaps more importantly for the
strategic facilities manager, on the grounds of time. The rail operators
have inherited a rail infrastructure which, although requiring substantial
investment, connects the hearts of the main city centres within the UK. In
contrast, the new low-cost air carriers are operating between obscure
localities such as Teeside and Luton, neither of which are likely to
reflect either the beginning point or ultimate destination of the large
majority of the passengers which use the carriers operating between them.
Whilst there is, at present, a clear advantage in terms of the time in
which the air carriers can physically move people between these points
(when compared with rail carriers), there is, in fact, very little
difference in terms of the total journey time when allowing for airport
processes and procedures and when considering the time taken to get to the
departure airport and to transfer from the arrival airport to the ultimate
destination.

Rail carriers and Railtrack are presently investing in new rolling
stock and infrastructure respectively which are likely to reduce the time
necessary for long-distance rail travel. Meanwhile, a general growth in
air travel to non-domestic destinations can be predicted from the same
obscure airports as used for low cost domestic flights. With an outdated
and under-invested air traffic control system, this is likely to mean
increase in the time aircraft spend in the air between these hubs. Thus,
if the low cost airlines are to continue to grow and compete on grounds of
time, there are obvious process issues that require to be examined. If the
airports in question are to continue generating revenue and increase the
throughput of travellers using low cost carriers in an effective manner,
the strategic facilities manager has a significant role to play.

The challenge for the facilities manager

Barter (1992) set out the need for a clear understanding of the airport
business rationale if the business itself is to be successful. The
low-cost airlines have presently established themselves as a viable
alternative to ground based transportation in the case of short haul
domestic travel demand. It can be anticipated that the demand for such
travel is capable of further significant growth since the volume of
passengers carried by the rail carriers (for example between Edinburgh and
London) remains substantially more than those carried by the low-cost
airlines. However, to realise this growth potential, the regional airport
facilities used by these airlines must be capable of handling significant
increases both in the number of aircraft manoeuvres on aprons, taxiways
stands and runways and just as importantly, must be capable of processing
and handling a significantly higher passenger throughput. This is of much
importance due to the competitive aspect which should be attached to the
total journey process time. Whilst the rail stations in the UK may not be
the most amenable facilities, they are, nevertheless, inherently simple.
The process of boarding the correct train at the correct time is very
straightforward in organisational terms when compared with the processes
involved in checking in for flights and boarding aircraft. There are, of
course, limitations since it is unlikely that the airport would be capable
of matching the flexibility of the rail station whereby a traveller can
arrive one minute prior to departure time and board the train with
relative ease; even in the case of missing the intended train, the
traveller can rely on the likelihood of another within 45 minutes; not the
case with the low-cost airline at present.

Thus, the challenge for the airport facilities manager is one of space
planning, logistics and process mapping, all core ingredients of the
contemporary facilities management discipline (Pitt and Brown, 2000a;
2000b).

Typically, an understanding of the airport's business rationale would
be an integral part of the function of an airport's facilities management
team (whether this be the airport itself or a consultant). Regional
airports, however, often have little experience in the "Easy Jet" style of
airline, having mainly experienced freight, charter or small schedule (low
passenger throughput) airlines in the past. An understanding of the
process needs of these new low cost airlines is therefore essential to
attracting them and enabling them to continue to offer their products at
the price levels that have been established, while also permitting the
sustained growth of their businesses. In this regard, the facilities
manager can play an integral role in the development of the airport
business through recognising the changing needs of the airport customers,
both the airlines (for whom the capability to compete with ground
transportation and to sustain growth are of principal concern) and the
travelling public (for whom ease of use and more streamlined processing
capabilities are of importance in evaluating the method which they should
use for domestic travel).

The strategic facilities manager

Strategic facilities managers at regional airports should be thoroughly
familiar with the needs of the new airlines through a simple study of
their public identity. Easy-Jet, for example, makes much in its
advertising of the new links between London-Luton and Central London. This
suggests that what is sought is an easy connection on ground public
transport to whatever major conurbation is being served. One of the main
causes of passengers arriving late at Luton is ground traffic, and this
can be reduced through encouraging centre-to-centre travel by rail or bus.
One of the major requirements of a new airline will therefore be the
accessibility of the airport in general terms and the facilities manager
is there to ensure that easy access is provided. The access requirement
will, however, remain subordinate to the overall strategic aim of ruthless
cost cutting. An airline which prides itself on the simplicity of its
operation and service will not want to be associated with an airport that
is congested and overcrowded. There remains, however, the elusive answer
to the cost to convenience trade-off. There is no question that the
low-cost airlines tend to fly to the less popular airports surrounding
London and that their passengers are prepared to do this. The extent to
which people are prepared to sacrifice point of arrival convenience for
money depends upon more factors than can be covered here. What is
important, however, is that in strategic terms the facilities manager can
make a difference to passengers' perceptions of a particular airport.
Heathrow cannot, in the short-term, escape its congested reputation and it
is from this, possibly unique, position of strength that more passengers
can be attracted to the more distant airports.

Of course, the one thing that strategic facilities managers cannot
easily change is the location of the airport. There are undoubtedly cases
where the airport is inappropriately positioned to meet the needs of the
expanding passenger market. This fact is significant. The development (or
otherwise) of regional airports, such as Carlisle, in apparently unusual
locations will be interesting to watch.

Thinking ahead

The major airport strategists look well into the future and plan for
increased traffic where appropriate. There are always surges that are
difficult to predict such as the large increase in domestic traffic
through Edinburgh even before the advent of the Scottish parliament.
Edinburgh is an example to all facilities managers that what was once
considered a relatively minor regional airport can turn into a major
domestic and minor international one virtually overnight.

According to the Civil Aviation Authority (1998), Manchester is the
third largest airport in the UK with around 17.2 million passengers in
1998. As long ago as 1991 Manchester Airport publicly recognised the need
for a second runway. The behind-the-scenes developments that led to this
public declaration would undoubtedly have gone on for many years prior to
this. The challenge for the more provincial strategic facilities manager
lies in matching the ability of the larger airports to plan and predict
air transport growth and passenger numbers at a local level. As can be
seen from Manchester, the planning of infrastructure can take many years
and the building even longer. The long awaited second Manchester runway is
finally set to open this year. Planning an airport runway is a complicated
process but it nonetheless lies at the core of the airport business. The
facilities manager must be aware that plans today may not come to fruition
until the year 2015.

The competition problem

Understanding the airport competition issue is often complicated by the
large amount of legislation that disrupts normal modelling. These legal
constraints come from both domestic and international dictates. They are
complex and great in number. What is important is that legislation
disrupts the normal operation of market forces that might, for example,
lead the owners of an airport to give some financial advantage to one
airline over another.

In the UK scheduled airline services have in recent times become
polarised. The importation of the low-fare carrier philosophy from the USA
provides a viable and cheaper alternative to the traditional network
carrier's product. Essentially, the low fare carriers in and around the UK
are Easy-Jet, Ryanair, Go, Buzz and Virgin
Express. The network carriers in the UK are principally represented by
British
Airways, although other examples would include British Midland and KLM
UK.

This paper focuses partly on Dublin International Airport which is
currently owned by Aer Rianta which in turn is owned by the Irish
government. At the request of the Irish Minister for Public Enterprise,
Mary O'Rourke, Aer Rianta (1999) produced a report on its future strategic
direction. The report was produced in conjunction with professional
advisers, amongst whom was Arthur Andersen. In the report, Aer Rianta
addresses the issue of the rise of the low-fare carrier. In this context
the report identifies the fundamental differences between the two types of
carrier as shown in Table I.

In the context of the differences that have been identified by Aer
Rianta and their professional advisers this paper will examine the
potential for an airport business to satisfy the differing requirements of
the network and low fare carriers.

Drawing comparisons: airports as just another industry

The test for the unique nature of airport facilities management as a
discipline is the extent to which the normal facilities management core
skills and tools apply. It has been shown that the skills required are
essentially the same (Pitt and Brown, 2000) but the exact nature of these
and the depth of knowledge required varies considerably in relation to
airports. Elements of international law apply to airports where they would
impinge little on the operations of most facilities; airports are
strategic weapons for many governments, with flag carriers acting as
advertising boards, and the environmental issues are so great as to demand
high levels of knowledge from the manager (Pitt and Jones, 2000a).

Airport income is often categorised as aeronautical and
non-aeronautical. The level of income which is derived from the two
categories is determined by the strategies which are followed. At Dublin,
aeronautical income has historically been far lower than non-aeronautical
income although this will undoubtedly change with the new strategic
direction that is being planned (Aer Rianta,1999).

Airports are unique facilities which form an integral part of economic
development. Hence the regulation of the airport business is an essential
tool in the overall management of any nation state. The skills required go
beyond the normal facilities skill, making airport facilities management a
significantly specialised area. An airport cannot merely be seen as just
another facility.

Dublin Airport

As a state owned company currently being considered for privatisation,
Aer Rianta is currently going through a period of major change. The
current position is one that might be considered unsustainable in the
private sector given the discrepancy in income terms between it and its
BAA neighbour in the UK. At the current time only 16 per cent of Aer
Rianta's income is derived from aeronautical charges, with the bulk of
income coming from the very successful duty and VAT-free retailing
programme. As a public company, Aer Rianta has attracted new airlines and
has been able to assist these customers from a cost perspective, adding to
the socio-economic development of the country (Aer Rianta, 1999).

Aer Rianta has responded to the problem of the competing demands of the
airlines in the run up to its probable public offering by appointing a new
terminals manager with airline experience and looking closely at its
long-term strategy through reports produced in conjunction with external
consultants. The result is a situation of changing attitudes to the
demands of the airlines. Aer
Lingus can no longer regard principal status at Dublin as a matter of
right. It must earn this right in the competitive airline industry against
its low-cost rival. Ryanair can no longer expect the low charges that it
currently enjoys. For Aer Rianta, the problem is one of deciding whether
the cost of retaining or losing a particular customer within any economic
framework is the better course. In this regard no real decision has been
made.

The problem that has to be addressed is the difficulty that will be
experienced in satisfying the requirements of both customers at the same
airport.

The Ryanair operation

Ryanair's operation, put simply, is just fast. Unlike network
carriers, Ryanair does nothing slowly to ease the customer's progress
through the service. The Ryanair service appears very efficient. The most striking
part of the service is the speed at which the older 737-200 aircraft are
turned around. It is here that Ryanair makes a difference with its aircraft, spending
approximately 50 per cent of its time in the air compared with around 25
per cent for short-haul British
Airways flights.

The efficiency of the Ryanair service depends upon the effective execution of the
turn around operation. This is typically completed within a 20 minute time
slot. Failure to achieve this time can have a serious impact upon the low
fare carrier's schedule (and subsequently, profitability). A network
carrier presently chooses to allocate between 45 minutes and one hour for
an identical operation. The Ryanair turn around operations watched from the departure
lounge have an inevitable look of chaos but nearly always result in the
desired push back time being achieved. In choosing the 737-200 Ryanair have not simply chosen to buy older aircraft, but
assets which are generally reliable and good for the quick turn around
operation (it takes approximately five to ten minutes longer to turn
around the newer 737-800).

In an environment where time is very much central to the profitability
of the business, the unique requirements of Ryanair can be summarised as follows.

In general, the approach taken by Ryanair is to:

- seek to reduce delays;

- reduce the time taken at all stages of the operations; and

- to emphasise the importance of the airline's presence to Dublin
airport whilst negotiating airport charges.

The low level of charges paid to Aer Rianta by Ryanair allows the airline to break one of the "rules" of
being a low-fare carrier in that it operates from a primary airport. The
low charges at Dublin are justified on the basis of the socio-economic
expansion referred to earlier and the relative success of Aer Rianta in
making profits from non-aeronautical sources. In fact the charges for
parking aircraft are so low that aircraft often fly in from overseas to
park overnight.

In common with Easy-Jet, Ryanair essentially wants to be left to move people around
according to its own needs rather than in line with the airport's needs.
It can do this best through dedicated facilities and through controlling
the speed at which each phase of the service is delivered. Recently, Ryanair made proposals to Aer Rianta to secure a long-term
position at Dublin airport. The proposals ranged from the creation of a
dedicated Ryanair terminal to the construction of a dedicated Ryanair pier at the existing terminal. (Arthur Andersen,
1999). The low-fare carrier generally wants "no frills". The owner of
Easy-Jet recently described development at Luton Airport for which he was
asked to pay as a "white elephant".

The low-fare carriers may not want to see airport growth, or at the
very least they will wish to see growth happen in a different way. In
essence, they are not prepared to pay for the growth that may, in fact, be
necessitated by their own activity. In the past, both Easy-Jet and Ryanair have threatened to move operations from their current
hubs in disputes with the airport owners over the provision of
facilities.

The Aer
Lingus operation

The network carrier product is the more familiar and established one.
Aer
Lingus is the Irish national flag carrier, currently in public
ownership, but facing imminent privatisation plans. Like most network
carriers it offers a full service with all of the extras, concerning
itself with the quality of everything from its food to its image.

The airline has none of the low fare characteristics and presents an
entirely different set of requirements to airport managers.

Table II sets out the different requirements of the two distinctly
different types of airline.

Solving the problem

The operational and strategic differences that exist between the two
types of airline under examination are shown in Table I. These differences
are fundamental but do not all necessarily present a challenge to the
facilities manager. Table II presents the differences as they translate
into facilities requirements. The provision of facilities that match the
low cost requirement and the prestigious requirement within the same
airport terminal facility is virtually impossible. In order to meet the
requirements of the differing types of airlines a new strategic approach
will need to be developed by the airport managers.

What is needed is a strategic direction that deals with the issues that
effect the immediate surroundings of the airport (Pitt and Jones, 2000b)
and allows economic growth to continue unhindered through permitting the
development of airline transport in its various forms. The development of
this strategy cannot be an "arm's-length" operation. It must involve the
airlines and the airports in the development of an air transport policy
which looks towards the middle of this century. Only then can the
haphazard reactive management styles that have characterised the airline
sector conflict be finally resolved.

Strategic progress

If an airport is not able to deal with the two distinctly different
types of customer in their existing form, some new strategic direction is
required to accommodate both types of carrier.

There are a number of possible strategic options. These are:

- the "two airport" strategy;

- the "two terminal" strategy; or

- the "dedicated terminal pier" strategy.

Each is examined below.

The two airport strategy

Business managers, and therefore facilities managers at Aer Rianta
could consider the construction of a separate airport facility elsewhere
in Dublin to cater for the specific needs of low-fare carriers. The
ability to pursue such an option is constrained by the need to comply with
international legal dictates that demand competition between airports. Aer
Rianta has examined the competition question in the report commissioned of
Arthur Andersen (1999). The report examines the nature of the airport
business and concludes that competition between two airports, where one is
created by new development, will encounter substantial problems.

In the case of Aer Rianta at Dublin, the four following conclusions may
be drawn based on Arthur Andersen's (1999) report:

(1) Any new airport facility must offer a significant number of
services already offered at Dublin International in order to achieve
compliance with competition dictates.

(2) An airport dedicated to and competing for low-cost carriers may
segment the market between the two Dublin airports. This fails to provide
sufficient overlap with business at the existing Dublin airport to provide
effective competition.

(3) The "two airport" proposal would result in resource duplication and
may be highly cost inefficient.

(4) It would be difficult to encourage airlines to switch their routes
to a new airport, thus causing competition problems.

The question of the provision of a new airport at Dublin is essentially
one of cost. The function of the suggested new airport is unclear. Major
airports airports essentially fall in the categories of "hourglass" hubs
(Doganis and Dennis, 1989), which serve directional traffic and waves
alternating in direction, and "gateway" hubs such as Heathrow. At the
moment Dublin probably falls into the former category, although the growth
as a gateway is often itself dependent upon strategic direction. Caves
(1997) suggests that new gateways are hard to justify and it seems likely
therefore that any new airport would be secondary in nature and at a
competitive disadvantage.

For these reasons, the two airport strategy is not feasible at Dublin
and it is likely to be unfeasible in other locations which may be
experiencing similar problems.

The two terminal strategy

The possibility of constructing a new terminal at Dublin was also
considered by Arthur Andersen (1999), in the context of the creation of
competition between terminals. While the purpose of the report was not to
establish the possibility of serving two types of airline, the conclusions
remain relevant. These were as follows:

- A terminal dedicated solely to low-cost carriers may segment business
between the new terminal and the existing Aer Rianta terminal. Unless
there are enough carriers willing to switch between the two terminals, a
new terminal may not provide an effective competitive constraint to the
existing Aer Rianta facilities.

- Any proposal for a second terminal would require large-scale
investment, could result in the duplication of resources and
infrastructure, and may again be highly cost inefficient.

The most important issue here is the first. What concerns Arthur
Andersen (1999) mainly is the question of the creation of competition
between the terminals. This paper is concerned with the inevitable
segregation of carrier types on a first class and second class basis. The
fact that segmentation may occur should not be seen as a potential problem
but an inevitable consequence of the two tiered airline system. Figures
show that growth at Dublin has been so great (Aer Rianta, 1998) that
expansion has been paramount in the strategy that has been pursued to
date. The strategic direction required is one that allows both the airport
and its customers to grow in the most efficient and cost-effective way. It
is argued that this goal cannot be achieved through the maintenance of
common facilities for all airlines.

The dedicated terminal pier approach

As discussed previously, a principal difference between the network
carrier and the low-fare carrier concerns the turn around process. This
process does not depend upon the terminal's core facilities in any way[1].
Rather, the effectiveness of the turn around process, upon which a
low-fare airlines profitability is so dependent, is governed by the
facilities provided at the aircraft stand. Such facilities comprise:

- the hard standing area for the aircraft;

- the proximity of the apron to the runway;

- the gate facility; and

- the passenger departure lounge.

This being the case, airport facilities managers can sensibly consider
the provision of dedicated piers as extensions to existing terminals to
cope with the specific demands and needs generated by the low-fare
carrier. In this way, one terminal, provided that it has sufficient
capacity, may be able to deal with the polarised needs of the different
carrier types in an effective manner. In the case of Dublin International,
Ryanair proposed to build a dedicated pier. The full terms of
this deal were not made public but Aer Rianta rejected the proposal,
perhaps because in this case, the pier would remain effectively in Ryanair's occupation once complete, giving them exclusivity
at a facility which could just as easily meet the needs of other low-fare
carriers such as Buzz or Go. This would, once again, give rise to
competition issues.

The fact that Aer Rianta declined this particular proposal does not
mean that the dedicated pier approach can be summarily dismissed by the
airport facilities manager in a general context.

Conclusion

This paper has discussed the problems that are presented to the
contemporary airport business and consequently, the airport facilities
manager, in seeking to provide facilities for two distinct groups of
airline.

The demands made by the different carriers have been examined and it
has been demonstrated that these vary to a degree whereby the provision of
one stand alone facility which is capable of fully satisfying both, is a
greatly complicated task.

Thus, airport facilities managers face an intractable task. In an
environment where a significant number of airports are struggling to meet
the demand in terms of passenger numbers and aircraft movements, airport
strategy managers are focussed upon implementing expansion plans which, in
all probability, fail to address the needs presented by low-fare carriers.
Yet the low-fare carriers are largely responsible for the growth
necessitating expansion.

The fact that a general solution to the facilities problems that have
been outlined in this paper has not been fully developed is not an
indication that facilities management is failing in the airport context.
However, it perhaps indicates that the facilities manager is not yet
integrated within the organisational structure that governs the strategic
decision-making process. To apply Mintzberg's model, the airport
organisation generally may be categorised as "machine bureaucracy"
(Mintzberg, 1983) insofar as the airport organisation tends towards
standardisation in terms of the facilities that it seeks to manage for all
airlines. This is perhaps of importance in solving the problem that has
been reviewed. The airport manager, and consequently airport facilities
manager, must recognise that in allowing low-fare carriers to operate
alongside network carriers, they have in essence tapped into two entirely
separate markets with different customers and distinct products. Thus
airport organisations perhaps need to move towards a more divisional form,
allowing the two carriers to be provided for separately within a single
airport complex.

This may better serve the needs of the two carriers (and ultimately the
airport's own business needs) and may lead towards a move towards a two
terminal approach, or to a dedicated pier approach, to solve the
identified problem. The facilities manager must have a strategic role in
facility planning and decision making, as well as a functional,
operational role making sure that the provided facilities work
effectively. It is possible that there is a need for a shift in
organisational culture to enable this and to allow the facilities manager
to adequately meet the needs of the two groups of airline.

Note

The core terminal facilities can be considered to comprise check-in
facilities, baggage handling, security control, restaurants and shopping
areas.

References

1. Aer Rianta (1998), Annual Report and Accounts.

2. Aer Rianta (1999), "Future strategic direction", Report to the
Minister for Public Enterprise.

3. Arthur Andersen (1999), "An economic framework for assessing airport
competition issues in Ireland", Summary Report prepared for Aer
Rianta.

4. Barter, S.L. (1992), "Developing an airport estate: maximising the
benefits", Journal of Property Finance, Vol. 3 No. 4, pp. 509-17.

5. Caves, R.E. (1997), "European airline networks and their
implications for airport planning', Transport Reviews, Vol. 17. No. 2. pp.
121-44.

6. Civil Aviation Authority (1998), UK Airports Annual Statements of
Movements, Passengers and Cargo, CAA, London.

7. Doganis, R. and Dennis, N. (1989), "Lessons in hubbing", Airline
Business, March, pp. 42-7.

8. Mintzberg, H. (1983), Structure in Fives; Designing Effective
Organizations, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ.

9. Pitt, M. and Brown, A. (2000a), "Challenges in strategic facilities
management: developing the airport business", Facilities Management,
May.

10. Pitt, M. and Brown, A. (2000b), "The competing demands made at
airports by network and low-fare carriers", Proceedings of CIB W70
Symposium on Facilities Management, Brisbane, November.

11. Pitt, M. and Jones, M. (2000a), "Modelling the effect of airport
noise on property values", Facilities, Vol. 18. Nos 9/10.

12. Pitt, M. and Jones, M. (2000b), "Challenges in strategic facilities
management: the importance of considering noise levels in industry (case
study airports)", The Valuer, November/December.

[Illustration]

Caption: Table I; Differences between low-fare
and network carriers; Table II; Facilities expectations of low-fare
and network carriers

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